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1
INTRODUCTION
Mechanisms to regulate the transfer, management
and distribution of natural resources found on, under
or above the surface of the earth have long been a
source of discussion. Plant genetic resources are no
exception, and for some decades now, the
international community has been searching not
only for ways to conserve these resources, but also
to share, in a fair and equitable way, the benefits
deriving from their use. By looking briefly into the
history of these debates, and discussing the central
concepts that have steered the discussions on how
these resources should best be managed, this article
will analyse the strengths and weaknesses of the
existing international agreements in terms of their
ability to create a fair and equitable regime of Access
and Benefit Sharing (ABS).
Although none of these international agreements
define the terms ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’, they do point
to some principles of justice that may guide the
sharing of benefits derived from the utilisation of
genetic resources. This article will analyse these
principles and show that the main model of ABS, as
adopted by the Convention on Biological Diversity,
can never lead to a fair and equitable outcome. This
article therefore proposes an alternative ABS regime
– the utilisation model – on the basis of the principles
of justice it identifies. Eventually, this hypothetical
model will be compared with the latest internationally
agreed text on ABS – the Nagoya Protocol – in order
to determine whether this protocol is leading us
towards a fair and equitable ABS regime.
2
THE ORIGIN OF ABS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW
The origin of the concept of access and benefit
sharing – the idea that the benefits derived from the
utilisation of a particular resource to which one has
access should be shared with others – in international
law may be found in the 1970s. At that time, benefit
sharing was closely related to the concept of the
common heritage of humankind. For example, both
concepts appeared in the Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies,1 and during the negotiations towards the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.2
In the former it was declared that the ‘Moon and its
natural resources are the common heritage of
mankind’ and it subsequently established a provision
on the ‘equitable sharing by all States Parties in the
benefits derived from those resources’ discovered on
the moon.3 In the latter, it is stated that ‘the area of
the sea-bed (…) as well as its resources, are the
common heritage of mankind, the exploration and
exploitation of which shall be carried out for the
benefit of mankind as a whole’.4
With respect to plant genetic resources, the concept
of benefit sharing appeared for the first time in the
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources (IUPGR) of the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organisation (FAO).5 In its first Article,
the document outlines that the ‘Undertaking is based
on the universally accepted principle that plant
genetic resources are a heritage of mankind and
consequently should be available without
restriction’.6 Through its resolutions in 1989,7 the
FAO tried to achieve a balance between the interests
of farmers, especially those in developing countries,
as the historic, present, and future stewards and
innovators of plant genetic resources on the one
hand, and formal innovators as plant breeders and
the biotechnology industry on the other by
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1 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, New York, 5
December 1979, 1363 UNTS 3 / 18 ILM 1434 (1979).
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 / 21
ILM 1261 (1982).
3 Moon Treaty, note 1 above, Articles 11.1 & 11.7(d).
4 UNCLOS, note 2 above, preamble.
5 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources,
Rome, 23 November 1983, in Report of the Conference
of FAO Twenty-second Session, Resolution 8/83.
6 Id., Article 1.
7 Resolution 4/89 ‘Agreed Interpretation of the
International Undertaking’ and Resolution 5/89 ‘Farmers’
Rights’ (paragraph 108), Rome, 29 November 1989, in
Report of the Conference of FAO Twenty-fifth Session.
establishing the so-called farmers’ rights in order to,
‘allow farmers (…) to participate fully in the benefits
derived (…) from the improved use of plant genetic
resources, through plant breeding and other
scientific methods’.8
The concept of access and benefit sharing came more
and more to the foreground. It was not, however,
until the adoption of the Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD)9 in 1992 that ABS became operative
at both international and national levels. The CBD
emphasises that ‘States have sovereign rights over
their own biological resources’.10 It declares,
furthermore, that access to genetic resources should
be subject to ‘sharing in a fair and equitable way the
results of research and development and the benefits
arising from the commercial and other utilisation of
genetic resources with the Contracting Party
providing such resources’.11 With respect to
traditional knowledge, the CBD states that each
country, subject to its national legislation, shall
‘promote their wider application with the approval
and involvement of the holders of such knowledge,
innovations and practices and encourage the equitable
sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of
such knowledge, innovations and practices’.12
Almost a decade later, the discussions surrounding
the IUPGR of the FAO culminated in the adoption
of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGR) in 2001.
This treaty, while in harmony with the CBD,13
creates an alternative ABS regime for the agricultural
sector in order to facilitate access to, and the
international transfer of, those plant genetic resources
that are ‘the raw material indispensable for crop genetic
improvement’ and thus global food security.14 As
one of its central benchmarks it states that:
In the exercise of their sovereign rights over
their plant genetic resources for food and
agriculture, states may mutually benefit from
the creation of an effective multilateral
system for facilitated access to a negotiated
selection of these resources and for the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising
from their use.15
As such, the ITPGR establishes a list of 64 major crops
and forages that are freely accessible for breeders and
researchers of member countries. Furthermore, the
ITPGR includes an international fund for which
payment is due when a commercial product is
developed using resources from the Multilateral
System of Access and Benefit-Sharing (Multilateral
System).16 The fund is then linked to the benefit
sharing provisions that aim to facilitate ‘the exchange
of information, access to and transfer of technology,
capacity-building, and the sharing of the benefits
arising from commercialisation’, in particular to help
small farmers in developing countries.17
3
SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP VERSUS
COMMON HERITAGE
The question whether plant genetic resources (for
food and agriculture) fall under the sovereign rights
of states, or instead should be considered a common
heritage of mankind, appears as a central issue in
the history of ABS. Through the CBD, States can
regulate access to their resources and negotiate the
accompanying benefit sharing conditions. ABS is
thus considered a compensation mechanism between
the providers and the users of plant genetic resources.
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8 Id., Resolution 5/89, final Article.
9 Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5
June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992).
10 Id., preamble.
11 Id., Article 15 (7).
12 Id., Article 8 (j).
13 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, Rome, 3 November 2001, in Report of
the Conference of FAO Thirty-first Session, Resolution
3/2001, Article 1.1.
14 Id., preamble.
15 Id.
16 Payment is voluntary if the commercialised product can be
used without restriction by others for further research and
breeding, it is compulsory if not. See S. Bhatti, ‘The
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources’, in P.F
Uhlir ed., Designing the Microbial Research Commons:
Proceedings of an International Symposium 137
(Washington DC: The National Academies Press, 2011).
17 See ITPGR, note 13 above, Article 13.2.
Notably, this understanding of ABS was a reaction
against the idea of ‘common heritage’ to which the
concept of benefit sharing was formerly linked. In
the years preceding the conclusion of the CBD, the
gene-rich developing countries had become
increasingly dissatisfied with the free and
uncompensated use of their biological diversity.
With the rise of the new biotechnology industry and
accompanying intellectual property regulations,
genetic resources became more and more valuable
but their benefits accrued largely to the developed
countries where the biotechnology industries were
based.18 The ABS framework of the CBD addresses
this imbalance by requiring a part of the benefits
that users derive from genetic resources to flow back
to the original providers.
The first two objectives of the CBD are ‘the
conservation of biological diversity’ and ‘the
sustainable use of its components’.19 The benefit-
sharing component appears to satisfy these first two
objectives as it creates incentives for developing
countries to conserve their biodiversity (the promise
of benefit sharing), while at the same time providing
access to the means for conservation (the content of
benefit sharing). Thus, in theory, the CBD creates a
win-win situation or grand bargain between the
‘North’ and the ‘South’,20 with the fast growing bio-
industries in the gene-poor developed countries
benefitting from access to the genetic resources of
the biodiversity-rich developing countries. These, in
turn, would benefit from a share in the benefits
(information, technologies, profits) accrued from
these industries. Ideally, these measures would promote
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
In this respect, the affirmation of the CBD that plant
genetic resources fall under the sovereign rights of
states21 seems appropriate. One argument
supporting this approach is that were the resources
still to be considered part of the common heritage
of humankind, it would be logically impossible to
demand compensation for access. On the contrary,
it might well be argued that if resources are
commonly owned then ‘Who gets to use them
should not depend on accidents of space and time’.22
Thus, those countries, which happen to be rich in
certain resources, ought to no more than grant,
facilitate and regulate access to those that are not
resource-rich.
Another argument for sovereign rights over plant
genetic resources is that it may prevent a ‘tragedy of
the commons’,23 in which private gains ultimately
become a universal loss. This theory describes a
situation in which people have equal access to a
limited resource. Countries and individuals acting
primarily in their own self-interest are motivated to
maximise use of the free resource to the point of
exhaustion. The resource will then be lost even
though this will not actually be in anybody’s long-
term interest. Such a scenario is, of course,
particularly relevant to the case of genetic resources
given the increasingly vulnerable state of the world’s
ecosystems housing its biodiversity and the pressing
need to conserve which is the original reason why
the CBD was developed in the first place.
But is this classification of plant genetic resources
really well chosen? Certainly, the sovereign rights-
based bilateral exchange model of ABS had a serious
drawback, which soon became apparent. Shortly
after the signing of the CBD in 1992, a rapid decline
was observed in the international transfer of plant
genetic resources for food and agriculture, and the
number of new collections.24 The main reason for
this was that many countries emphasised the
protection of their plant genetic resources against
misuse, which created both multiple barriers for
exchange and increased transaction costs.
Furthermore, the immature status of the new ABS
regulations in combination with the growing
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18 P.W.B Phillips and C.B. Onwuekweeds, Accessing and
Sharing the Benefits of the Genomics Revolution
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2007).
19 See CBD, note 9 above, Article 1.
20 M. Byström, P. Einarsson and C.A. Nycander, Fair and
Equitable: Sharing the Benefits From Use of Genetic
Resources and Traditional Knowledge (Uppsala,
Tagstalund and Bjorkeryd: Swedish Scientific Council on
Biological Diversity, 1999).
21 See CBD, note 9 above, Article 15 (1).
22 M. Risse, ‘How Does the Global Order Harm the Poor?’
33/4 Philosophy Public Affairs 349, 360 (2005).
23 G. Hardin, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons’ 162 Science
1243 (1968).
24 C. Fowler and T. Hodgkin, ‘Plant Genetic Resources for
Food and Agriculture: Assessing Global Availability’ 29
Annual Review of Environment and Resources 143 (2004).
number of allegations of biopiracy25 scared away
many potential users and collectors. This can be
considered detrimental to agriculture and food
security because crop improvement has always
depended significantly on extensive flows of genetic
material around the world.26
Another difficulty with the sovereign rights model
of the CBD is that biological diversity and plant
genetic resources do not readily fit into a national
ownership model. Living organisms such as plants
grow and multiply in large numbers and their seeds
can travel across vast distances. Their valuable
content lies especially in their DNA, which can be
found in any part of every specimen. Furthermore,
this DNA can be translated into information – the
genetic sequence – which can in turn be disseminated
through mechanisms such as the internet and then
utilised without the user having access to the plant itself.
These non-rival and non-excludable characteristics27
mean that plant genetic resources cannot be
appropriated and traded by a country in the same
way as other natural resources, such as oil or timber.
But isn’t this difficulty merely a restatement of an
important motivation behind the ABS framework
in the CBD in the first place? It is precisely because
plant genetic resources were originally considered a
common heritage of humankind and also have many
characteristics of a public good that the CBD model
of ABS as a bilateral exchange mechanism was
established. Indeed, all that the ABS system does is
attempt to ensure that countries receive some
compensation for the use of their plant genetic
resources because the resources can otherwise so
easily be – and were being – exploited for free,
especially by those with strong technical capacities.
In order to neutralise the harmful effects of the CBD
on the agricultural sector, the Conference of the
Parties of the CBD invited the FAO to develop an
alternative system for plant genetic resources related
to food and agriculture. This resulted in the adoption
of the ITPGR and its Multilateral System of Access
and Benefit-Sharing.28 As explained above, this
Multilateral System includes a list of 64 major crops
and forages freely accessible under a standard
material transfer agreement, thus avoiding the need
for bilateral negotiations. Through this system, the
international transfer of the included resources has
increased again, amounting to over 440,000
accessions in one year,29 which represents more than
8500 transfers per week. Obviously, it would have
been impossible to negotiate an ABS agreement on
a bilateral basis for all these transfers.
So in essence, the ITPGR creates a gene pool, a
genetic commons, while recognising the sovereign
rights of States over their own plant genetic resources
for food and agriculture.30 Countries that have
ratified the treaty and organisations such as the
Consultative Group on International Agricultural
Research and the International Atomic Energy
Agency have put their plant genetic resources into
the pool – the Multilateral System. Any party around
the world can access these materials under the same,
multilaterally agreed terms of the standard material
transfer agreement. The ITPGR states that this
facilitated access to plant genetic resources for food
and agriculture ‘constitutes itself a major benefit of
the Multilateral System’.31
But next to this ‘major benefit’, the treaty also
contains the obligation to share in a fair and equitable
way the benefits arising from the utilisation of these
resources.32 This obligation is further specified in
the standard material transfer agreement itself. Once
a party develops and commercialises a new variety
that incorporates material from the Multilateral
System, and if this variety is not freely available to
others for further research and breeding, that party
Nagoya: Towards a Fair and Equitable ABS Regime
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25 J. McGown, Out of Africa: Mysteries of Access and Benefit-
Sharing (Washington DC: The Edmonds Institute, 2006).
26 See Fowler and Hodgkin, note 24 above.
27 Non-rival means that the consumption by one does not
prevent others from enjoying the same good, and non-
excludable means that non-owners cannot (easily) be
excluded from consumption either. See I. Kaul, I.
Grunberg and M. Sterneds, Global Public Goods:
International Cooperation in the 21st Century (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
28 See ITPGR, note 13 above, part IV.
29 International Institute for Sustainable Development,
‘ITPGR GB 3 #2’, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Tuesday
2 June 2009, available at http://www.iisd.ca/download/
pdf/enb09467e.pdf.
30 See ITPGR, note 13 above, Article 10.1.
31 Id., Article 13.1.
32 Id., Article 1.1.
and fair play and can, as such, serve as guidelines to
identify the ethical dimensions of the international
treaties and conventions under assessment. In other
words, this section aims to employ different
principles of justice as heuristic tools in order to
clarify what is understood by fair and equitable
benefit sharing in the context of the CBD and the
ITPGR.39
The principle of justice that seems most relevant is
the principle of ‘entitlement’. This principle holds
that someone’s due is that to which one has a right
or one is entitled to.40 The CBD declares that each
State has sovereign rights over their own biological
resources.41 It further makes reference to the
‘country of origin of genetic resources’,42 in order
to more specifically define this entitlement. Access
to these resources is subject to sharing the benefits
arising from the use of these resources ‘with the
Contracting Party providing such resources’.43 As
such, it is the principle of entitlement that forms
the basis of the bilateral exchange mechanism that
the CBD establishes: Countries are to be
compensated for the use of the resources that fall
under their sovereignty.
A second principle of justice that is relevant for
guiding the fair and equitable sharing of benefits is
the principle of ‘desert’. According to this principle,
a person’s due is based on what one deserves in light
of one’s actions. While there are several desert-based
principles each with a different interpretation of
what should count as the basis for deserving,44 in
the context of ABS, one’s contribution to the
conservation and/or development of plant genetic
resources seems most relevant. The Bonn Guidelines
is obliged to pay 1.1 per cent minus 30 per cent of
net sales of that product into the treaty’s benefit
sharing fund.33 This trust fund distributes the
accumulated funds according to multilaterally
agreed-upon funding priorities such as to farmers in
developing countries that conserve and sustainably
use plant genetic diversity.34
4
PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ABS
But do the CBD and the ITPGR indeed succeed in
establishing a fair and equitable ABS regime? To
answer that question, this section first analyses what
is understood by ‘fair’ and ‘equitable’ in this context.
Although neither term is defined, the CBD, the
ITPGR and the Bonn Guidelines on Access to
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing
of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilisation (Bonn
Guidelines) point to several principles of justice that
may guide the sharing of benefits derived from the
utilisation of genetic resources.35
‘Justice’ is a very contested concept,36 and there are
several principles of justice each of which can be
applied to a variety of contexts.37 Their persuasive
power for guiding people’s moral behaviour is the
topic of ongoing debate, and their legal force in
international relations is strongly disputed.38 Yet,
principles of justice do point to ideas of fair treatment
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33 Resolution 1/2006 ‘Standard Material Transfer
Agreement’, Madrid, 16 June 2006, in IT/GB-1/06/
Report.
34 Bhatti, note 16 above.
35 This brief overview is derived from B. De Jonge, ‘What
is Fair and Equitable Benefit-sharing?’ 24 Journal of
Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 127 (2011).
36 K.H. Stumpf, Reconstructing the ‘Biopiracy’ Debate
from the Perspective of the Concept of Justice (SSRN
Working Paper Series, 2011).
37 B.B. Bunker and R.Z. Jeffrey eds, Conflict, Cooperation,
and Justice (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. Publishers,
1995) and J. Greenberg and R.L. Cohen eds, Equity and
Justice in Social Behaviour (New York: Academic Press,
1982).
38 C. Armstrong, Global Distributive Justice: An
Introduction (Cambridge University Press, 2012).
39 This approach is in line with a pragmatist ethics, which
does not start from an overarching moral principle or
particular theory of social justice. Instead, it claims the
freedom to apply existing moral principles and theories
wherever they can contribute to the practical inquiry
and ethical assessment of real-life questions and problems.
See J. Keulartz et al., ‘Ethics in Technological Culture:
A Programmatic Proposal for a Pragmatist Approach’
29 Science, Technology & Human Values 3 (2004).
40 D. Miller, Social Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976).
41 See CBD, note 9 above, Article 15 (1).
42 Id., Article 2.
43 Id., Article 15 (7).
44 J. Lamont, ‘The Concept of Desert in Distributive Justice’
44 The Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1994).
state, for example, that ‘benefits should be shared
fairly and equitably with all those who have been
identified as having contributed to the resource
management, scientific and/or commercial
process’.45 Similarly, with respect to the agricultural
sector, the so-called ‘farmers’ rights’ that form the
basis for benefit sharing in the ITPGR are based on
the ‘enormous contribution that the local and
indigenous communities and farmers of all regions
of the world (…) have made and will continue to
make for the conservation and development of plant
genetic resources which constitute the basis of food
and agriculture production throughout the world’.46
Although the principles of entitlement and desert
both aim to regulate the fair and equitable sharing of
benefits according to the idea of compensation, either
on the basis of entitlements or contributions, the
CBD and the ITPGR also point to another principle
of justice, namely the principle of ‘need’. This
principle holds that goods should be distributed in
accordance with people’s needs. The principle forms
the foundation for both the CBD and the ITPGR.
The latter is particularly concerned about the
fundamental need for food security, to which fair
and equitable benefit sharing is linked as a principal
objective.47 The CBD, in turn, states that ‘conservation
and sustainable use of biological diversity is of critical
importance for meeting the food, health and other
needs of the growing world population, for which
purpose access to and sharing of both genetic
resources and technologies are essential’.48
Next to these fundamental needs, the CBD and the
ITPGR both refer specifically to the ‘special needs’
of developing countries and countries with
economies in transition49 to which benefits should
primarily flow. In this way, both treaties
acknowledge the extra help these countries and their
farmers and communities need if they are to reach
the stated objectives. This relates to a fourth
principle, namely the principle that ‘equals should
be treated equally, and unequals unequally’,50
meaning that due to the existing inequalities,
developing countries are owed extra support and
thus a relatively bigger share of the benefits. This
idea that justice requires the unequal treatment of
unequals will – in short – be referred to as the
principle of ‘equity’.51
As discussed above, the concept of access and benefit
sharing is, on first sight, primarily about
compensation: Through the benefit sharing
mechanism one is to be compensated for providing
access to one’s resources. The principles of
entitlement and desert are based on the sharing of
benefits with those that have specific claims based
upon the rights they hold or particular contributions
they have made. The principles of need and equity,
however, do not work like this. They focus instead
on the distribution of benefits to those who need
them most.
But despite this difference, it must be emphasised
that both directions and purposes of benefit sharing
are equally important. This becomes evident when
one realises that it is exactly because of the
inequalities and neediness in the world that the
demand for benefit sharing as a compensation
mechanism has evolved. Schroeder and Pogge show
indeed that in an ideal world, it does not matter who
provides the genetic material or traditional
knowledge that lead to new inventions as long as
we all have access to the benefits of their use.52
Unfortunately, we do not live in such an ideal world,
and a large proportion of people simply do not have
access to either the benefits of modern research, or
even those goods that can save their lives. It is against
this background that the demands for benefit sharing
become obvious and, indeed, justified.53
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45 Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their
Utilisation, in Report of the Sixth Meeting of the
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, UN Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/
20 (2002), Article 48.
46 See ITPGR, note 13 above, Article 9.1.
47 Id, Article 1.1.
48 See CBD, note 9 above, preamble.
49 Id, Articles 12 & 17 and ITPGR, note 13 above, Article
13.
50 B. Barry, Political Argument 152 (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1965).
51 Id.
52 D. Schroeder and T. Pogge, ‘Justice and the Convention
on Biological Diversity’ 23 Ethics & International Affairs
267 (2009).
53 Id.
5
WHY IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE
TO ESTABLISH A FAIR AND
EQUITABLE ABS REGIME UNDER
THE CBD
As explained above, the CBD aims to establish a
bilateral exchange model of ABS, which is primarily
based on the sovereign rights of states over their own
genetic resources, i.e. the principle of entitlement.
In reality though, it is very difficult for (developing)
countries to secure a fair and equitable exchange of
their plant genetic resources for several reasons: First,
there are the aforementioned non-rival and non-
excludable characteristics of these resources,54 which
make it virtually impossible to exercise national
control over their movement. Or as Safrin concludes:
The challenge presented to developing
countries by the CBD is how to take a
nonrivalrous, abundant resource and make it
exclusive. How can nations prevent most, let
alone all, genetic resources of potential value
from leaving their borders? They cannot.55
Second, it is very difficult to determine and, thus, to
establish conclusively, the country of origin of a
particular genetic resource. For a country to claim
that it is the country of origin it has to prove so in
the face of millennia of evolutionary history.56
Third, the CBD conditions relate only to the cross-
border movement of resources after the treaty came
into force. This means that countries may have no
legal basis on which to demand compensation for
the use of their resources by foreign parties, as much
of their plant wealth has already long since left its
native territory and is now to be found dispersed in
botanical gardens and gene banks around the world.
Law, Environment and Development Journal
Other difficulties relate to the situation in which a
particular genetic resource is shared among or
originates from multiple countries. The questions
then are how to decide who gets a share of the
benefits, what that share should be or how to prevent
a race to the bottom as the party interested in the
resource tries to negotiate the cheapest ABS
agreement possible. In addition, there has never
existed a substantial market for these resources, a
fact that compounds the difficulties inherent in
determining values for these genetic resources. This
also makes it difficult to measure relative
contributions, something on which a proper
implementation of the principle of desert depends.
Similarly, the contribution to the development and
conservation of plant genetic resources of
‘indigenous communities and farmers of all regions
of the world’,57 which is central to the benefit
sharing component in the ITPGR, cannot (and does
not) serve as a concrete allocation principle.
Although this article focuses specifically on ABS in
relation to plant genetic resources, it is worth
mentioning that many of the difficulties experienced
by (developing) countries are experienced also by
farmers and communities in their efforts to protect
and secure benefit sharing for their traditional
knowledge. Looking at the principle of entitlement
in this context, it appears that intellectual property
rights would be the best instrument to protect one’s
traditional knowledge and to demand compensation
for its use. Yet, in contrast to the knowledge that is
developed by companies, universities and research
centres, traditional knowledge holders cannot
normally protect their knowledge through such
rights. The main reason for this is that traditional
knowledge is often openly and collectively
developed in a communal environment, a socio-
economic setting and cultural milieu which is very
different from the competitive and industrial context
of formal knowledge development and the
corresponding intellectual property protection
standards. Also with respect to the principle of
desert, the difficulty is again to decide and quantify
who gets what share of the benefits if the knowledge
is shared among different communities, or even
among different members within one community.
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54 See Kaul, Grunberg and Sterneds, note 27 above.
55 S. Safrin, ‘Hyperownership in a Time of Biotechnological
Promise: The International Conflict to Control the
Building Blocks of Life’ 98 The American Journal of
International Law 641, 665 (2004).
56 M. Petit et al., Why Governments Can’t Make Policy:
The Case of Plant Genetic Resources in the International
Arena (Lima: International Potato Centre, 2001). 57 See ITPGR, note 13 above.
But as any transaction involves two parties, user
countries can help to overcome these difficulties by
implementing so-called ‘user-side measures’ to
enforce or at least stimulate a just exchange of these
resources. However, very few countries have
implemented compliance mechanisms thus far. This
has resulted in the current state of affairs where users
who do not know or choose not to disclose the source
or origin of the resources they utilise, can avoid
compliance with any benefit sharing provision.
A final problem is that in many developing countries,
farmers and traditional communities lack the
informational, legal and financial resources to negotiate
a fair agreement as do their counterparts in the developed
world. A fair and equitable ABS regime can only be
realised if all parties concerned have equal opportunities
to participate in a transparent negotiation process,
at all levels - local, national and international.58
Considering all of the above, it has to be concluded
that it is practically impossible for  ‘providing’ countries
and communities to secure a fair exchange of either
the plant genetic resources found within their territory
or the traditional knowledge present in their culture.
Of course, in some cases a specific (and undisputed)
provider of a particular resource can be determined.
This provider may then negotiate a fair and equitable
ABS contract with a user party on mutually agreed
terms. But given the aforementioned difficulties and
characteristics of the resources involved, such cases
are the exception as proven by the relatively small
number of successful ABS agreements that are
implemented since the adoption of the CBD.59
6
DOES THE ITPGR DO ANY BETTER?
The ITPGR aims to regulate fair and equitable
benefit sharing specifically for plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture that are included
in the Multilateral System. Because of this
multilateral approach, the ITPGR circumvents some
of the main difficulties that frustrate the realisation
of fair and equitable benefit sharing under the CBD:
There is no need to prove a country of origin of
resources, and once a country or organisation has
put its gene bank under the auspices of the
Multilateral System it does not matter when (or from
where) the resources were collected. Also, the
problems of determining the value of resources, the
race to the bottom, and the power differences
between negotiation parties are circumvented by the
use of the standard material transfer agreement.
However, the ITPGR only governs a relatively small
number of plant genetic resources. Further, while
this treaty has been applauded for facilitating access
to the 64 crops and forages included in its
Multilateral System, its benefit sharing component
is considered weak as no benefit sharing payments
have been received so far.60 One reason for this is
that it generally takes seven to ten years to develop
and commercialise a new variety,61 a significant
delay before benefits start flowing back into the
system. And since many companies and breeders
protect their new varieties by Plant Breeders’
Rights,62 which allow others to use that variety for
further breeding, they are exempt from the benefit
sharing obligations in the ITPGR.
The FAO encourages users of the resources from
the Multilateral System to make voluntary payments
into the benefit-sharing fund.63 Member States are
requested to contribute,64 and some have indeed
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done so.65 A special case is Norway, which
contributes 0.1 per cent of all national seed sales to
the fund.66 But despite these efforts, the voluntary
contributions until January 2011 amounted to only
13.7 per cent of the agreed target between July 2009
and December 2014.67 For these reasons, the
expectation that the ITPGR, in its current form, will
indeed establish a fair and equitable ABS regime is
low, especially in developing countries.68 Some
developing country delegates have even threatened
to pull out of the ITPGR if facilitated access to the
plant genetic resources of the Multilateral System is
not fairly balanced with benefit sharing.69
7
IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES: THE
UTILISATION MODEL
But how then can a fair and equitable benefit sharing
mechanism be organised? The current set up of the
CBD makes it practically impossible for providing
parties to secure a fair exchange of their resources.
Therefore the author is of the opinion that the CBD
is in need of fundamental change and there is a need
to explore an alternative ABS mechanism guided by
the principles of justice underlying both the CBD
and the ITPGR. This implies that, at least for the
moment, the socio-political realities of the
negotiation process and respective country positions
should be ignored. When searching for a possible
alternative mechanism, one should keep in mind that
the goal of benefit sharing is to realise some form of
compensation and equity. Furthermore, it should
positively contribute to the other objectives of the
CBD and the ITPGR, i.e. the conservation and
sustainable use of biological diversity and food security.
Since it seems virtually impossible to realise a fair
and equitable ABS regime on the basis of a
mechanism that links benefit sharing obligations to
the bilateral exchange of plant genetic resources, this
article proposes an ABS mechanism that instead
focuses on the utilisation of such resources - a model
in which benefit sharing obligations are tied to the
use of plant genetic resources rather than their
exchange. One of the main advantages of such a
model – apart from the fact that it does not depend
on controlling the movement of plant genetic
resources – is that it emphasises the responsibilities
for benefit sharing on the user side. If users and user
countries are serious about the objectives stated in
the CBD and the ITPGR, they have to put a greater
effort in the realisation of a fair and equitable ABS
regime than has been done so far. In fact, the
principle of equity holds that the strongest parties
have the greatest responsibility in this regard. So, in
contrast to the current situation, where the signing
of an ABS agreement is a rare phenomenon, the
developed countries and parties must take
responsibility and make the system work.
According to Tvedt and Young, who first launched
the idea of establishing this alternative ABS model,
determining whether ‘the user took an action that
is considered to be the ‘utilisation of the genetic
resources’ [is] a question that can be answered
objectively and documented by evidence’.70 Yet, this
will only be possible if the contracting parties to
the CBD manage to clearly define exactly which
activities do and do not constitute utilisation of
genetic resources that requires the sharing of certain
benefits. One possible option is to set benefit sharing
obligations for specific products from the moment
that these products are placed on the market. This
could include specific products such as cosmetics,
propagation materials and pharmaceuticals, which
are (partly) composed of, or derived from, genetic
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than those set for propagation materials and
pharmaceuticals, while seeds and essential medicines
targeting the needs of developing countries could be
exempted from benefit sharing obligations.
The establishment and enforcement of monetary
minimum standards of benefit sharing may in turn
promote the development and implementation of
other, more advanced forms of non-monetary benefit
sharing. For example, when companies have to obey
certain monetary standards of benefit sharing it may
become more attractive for them to invest in the
sharing of information, technologies or services. Such
forms of benefit sharing in kind have repeatedly been
emphasised since they have the potential to be very
valuable and efficient in terms of the broader
objectives of both the CBD and the ITPGR.74
The establishment of minimum, monetary benefit
sharing obligations are also needed to facilitate the
collection of benefits into an international fund in
cases where the provider of the utilised resources is
unknown, undisclosed, or in dispute (i.e. orphan
shares). Here, lessons can be drawn from the ITPGR.
With respect to the distribution of the collected
benefits, the contracting parties will have to decide
on the desired allocation criteria. Keeping in mind
the objectives of both the CBD and the ITPGR, and
the fact that benefit sharing aims to realise some form
of compensation and equity, a combination of
allocation criteria would appear to offer the best
prospects. Pursuing this avenue, benefits could be
distributed with the aim of compensating those
groups, countries or regions that have made
considerable contributions to the conservation of
biodiversity and promotion of food security – notably
centres of origin or diversity, and with extra attention
for those with special needs in this respect, and of
marginalised and impoverished groups or peoples.
Finally, it has been emphasised that a fair and
equitable benefit sharing system can only be realised
if all parties concerned have equal opportunities to
material.71  By specifically focussing on products that
are placed on the market the use of genetic resources
for research purposes is exempt.72 Also, obligations
for benefit sharing will apply irrespective of whether
intellectual property protection is acquired or not.73
The decision what constitutes utilisation of genetic
resources requiring benefit sharing will very likely
be subject to lengthy international debate. Yet, the
benefit of such an approach is that it can create a
clear entry point for the ABS system. Together with
the establishment of effective legislation in user
countries to stimulate and enforce compliance with
the ABS obligations, this could cut out the main
loophole in the current system and secure that
benefit sharing does in fact take place. This is,
obviously, an important precondition for realising
a fair and equitable ABS regime.
What is needed next is the development of a set of
well-defined, minimum standards of benefit sharing
obligations in tandem with a broad and creative
menu of other sharing options. The former are
needed to create clarity and a concrete basis for the
whole system. Although they are likely to be
formulated in monetary terms, they should not only
reflect market-based criteria but also take into
account the broader objectives of benefit sharing
(supporting nature conservation, food security,
equity, etc.). In the above example, one could for
instance develop different benefit sharing standards
for different products. In that way benefit sharing
obligations set for cosmetics could be more
demanding (e.g. involving higher monetary terms)
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participate in transparent negotiation processes. This
implies, among other things, that serious efforts have
to be undertaken to facilitate access to the
international ABS negotiations (and individual ABS
agreements) for representatives of farming and
indigenous communities, and to support their ability
to participate actively. It also involves that the alternative
worldviews and perspectives of such communities are
respected and treated as equal positions in dialogue.
The fact that many traditional communities find
themselves in a marginalised socio-political position
only heightens the issue and extends the support that
needs to be afforded to them in this respect.
8
IS NAGOYA LEADING US IN THE
RIGHT DIRECTION?
But to what extent is the utilisation model a realistic
option? In order to answer that question this section
will compare the proposed utilisation model with the
latest international agreement on ABS: The Nagoya
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilisation (Nagoya Protocol).75 The Nagoya
Protocol was the outcome of the tenth meeting of
the Conference of the Parties to the CBD, which took
place in October 2010. When evaluating its text with
the proposed utilisation model in mind, it is seen that
the protocol contains some promising elements.
Most importantly, the Nagoya Protocol demands
the establishment of user measures, stating in Article
15 that:
Each Party shall take appropriate, effective
and proportionate legislative, administrative
or policy measures to provide that genetic
resources utilised within its jurisdiction have
been accessed in accordance with prior informed
consent and that mutually agreed terms have
been established, as required by the domestic
access and benefit-sharing legislation or
regulatory requirements of the other Party.76
It continues by stating that ‘Parties shall take
appropriate, effective and proportionate measures
to address situations of non-compliance (...)’.77
Furthermore, Article 17 holds that ‘To support
compliance, each Party shall take measures, as
appropriate, to monitor and to enhance transparency
about the utilisation of genetic resources’.78
Measures to be developed are, amongst others, the
designation of several checkpoints and the
development of an internationally recognised
certificate of compliance.
Unfortunately, the user measures the Nagoya
Protocol refers to are not further defined. For
example, the designation of checkpoints is the
responsibility of all contracting parties. With respect
to the development of an internationally recognised
certificate of compliance, explicit reference is made
to Article 6 (3) (e), which leaves the responsibility
for such certificate (and for most other legislative
and administrative requirements necessary to make
the ABS system operational) to the ‘Party requiring
prior informed consent’.79 As such, the Nagoya
Protocol does not shift the responsibility for benefit
sharing to the (developed) countries and parties that
use plant genetic resources from abroad, but leaves
it to the ‘country of origin of such resources’.80
Equally problematic for the establishment of a
utilisation model on the basis of the current Nagoya
Protocol is its description of what constitutes
‘utilisation of genetic resources’. Article 2 (c) states
that ‘‘Utilisation of genetic resources’ means to
conduct research and development on the genetic
and/or biochemical composition of genetic
resources, including through the application of
biotechnology’. ‘Biotechnology’ is defined as ‘any
technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to
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make or modify products or processes for specific
use’.81 This definition is far too broad to serve as a
clear entry point for determining when benefit-
sharing obligations would apply. As argued in the
previous section, a clear definition of which activities
do and do not constitute utilisation of genetic
resources is an important precondition to secure that
benefit sharing does in fact take place.
While the Nagoya Protocol requires the
establishment of user measures, it is as strongly based
on the bilateral exchange model of ABS as is the
CBD. Fortunately, within the Nagoya Protocol
there is one Article that opens the door for an
alternative approach that is more in line with the
proposed utilisation model. This is Article 10,
entitled ‘global multilateral benefit-sharing
mechanism’. This Article states that:
Parties shall consider the need for and
modalities of a global multilateral benefit-
sharing mechanism to address the fair and
equitable sharing of benefits derived from the
utilisation of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources
that occur in transboundary situations or for
which it is not possible to grant or obtain
prior informed consent. The benefits shared
by users of genetic resources and traditional
knowledge associated with genetic resources
through this mechanism shall be used to
support the conservation of biological
diversity and the sustainable use of its
components globally.82
Such a global multilateral benefit sharing mechanism
would be suitable to organise the collection and
distribution of benefits in the many cases where the
provider of genetic resources is unknown,
undisclosed, or in dispute. Yet, again, this can only
be operationalized once it is absolutely clear what
act or activity triggers the obligation for benefit
sharing in the first place. The description provided
in Article 10 - ‘the utilisation of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources
that occur in transboundary situations or for which
it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed
consent’ - is not very useful in this respect. For example,
in the case where it is not clear whether the resource
in question has been collected before or after the CBD
came into force, it will be impossible to enforce the
sharing of benefits arising from their use.
Altogether we have to conclude that the Nagoya
Protocol is still far from the proposed utilisation
model. And given the history of the negotiation
process in both the CBD and the ITPGR,83 and also
in other international bodies in which the use of
plant genetic resources and related traditional
knowledge are being discussed such as the World
Trade Organisation and the World Intellectual
Property Organisation, this section concludes that
there are many countries that will not support such
a mechanism at this time. But this may change. A
time may come when member parties recognise that
the Nagoya Protocol in its current form, depending
as it does on controlling the movement of non-rival
and non-excludable resources, does not lead to a
workable ABS system for plant genetic resources.
At that point member parties may seriously start to
‘consider the need for and modalities of a global
multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism’, as the
Nagoya Protocol proposes.84
The multilateral ABS system of the ITPGR will then
be the main reference point. However, that system
needs improvement. Once developing countries start
pulling out of this treaty because of its weak benefit-
sharing component, the proposed utilisation model
may become more attractive because it can establish
a clear entry point for benefit sharing, and
emphasises the development of effective user
measures. As a result it can ensure that benefit
sharing does in fact take place. While the Nagoya
Protocol has taken a first step in this direction by
demanding the establishment of user measures,85 it
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is still a long way towards the realisation of a robust,
fair and equitable ABS regime. But if countries want
to secure the international transfer of plant genetic
resources, there is no other option than to keep
working towards this objective.
9
IN CONCLUSION
At this time, this article concludes that the limited
levels of interest shown and commitment made by
many developed countries and user parties is out of
proportion to the substantial investments necessary
in order to realise a fair and equitable ABS system.
They remain far removed from the position
developed in this article that it is the developed
countries and their associated parties, which have
the biggest responsibility to make the system work.
Of course, developing countries and communities
must play a role in the development of a fair and
equitable benefit sharing regime, but, as Shue has
stated, ‘among a number of parties, all of whom are
bound to contribute to some common endeavour,
the parties who have the most resources normally
should contribute the most to the endeavour’.86
This statement is based on the principle of equity,
which is fundamental to the concept of benefit
sharing. This means that as long as there are large
inequalities between the different parties involved,
benefits and burdens will be distributed unequally
with the weakest getting more benefits and the
strongest having to bear greater burdens. This would
imply, for example, that developed countries bear
most of the costs of the negotiation process and the
development of international mechanisms (without
receiving a stronger say during negotiations); that
the current international intellectual property
system be modified in order to protect and support
traditional knowledge holders, who currently have
least opportunities to secure and defend their rights;
and that user parties accept significantly higher
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benefit sharing standards and percentages than has
been the case thus far.
It must be clear that benefit sharing entails burden
sharing, so for a fair and equitable ABS regime to be
realised the burdens also have to be shared, fairly
and equitably. This article argues that the current
bilateral exchange model of the CBD and the Nagoya
Protocol can never be fair and equitable. Instead this
article proposes an alternative ABS regime based on
the utilisation of plant genetic resources instead of
their exchange. By defining exactly which activities
constitute utilisation of genetic resources requiring
benefit sharing, a clear entry point for the ABS
system can be established. Together with the
development of effective legislation in user countries,
this should ensure that benefit sharing does in fact
take place. A set of well-defined, minimum standards
of monetary benefit sharing obligations in tandem
with a broad and creative menu of other sharing
options would then make the system operational.
Both with respect to the collection of orphan shares
and the promotion of more advanced forms of non-
monetary benefit sharing, such a system has the
potential to be very valuable in terms of the dual
objectives of nature conservation and food security.
Keeping in mind these central objectives of the CBD,
the Nagoya Protocol and the ITPGR, and the fact
that benefit sharing aims to realise some form of
compensation and equity, the collected orphan
shares could be distributed with the aim of
compensating those parties that have made
considerable contributions to the conservation of
biodiversity and promotion of food security, and
pay attention to those with special needs.
Obviously, the establishment of such a system entails
major efforts and investments by all parties – and
especially the stronger. While it appears that the
current socio-political environment is not supportive
of this, countries that want to secure the international
transfer of plant genetic resources and also really want
to commit themselves to a fair and equitable ABS
regime, should consider this proposal as a possibility.
86 H. Shue, ‘Global Environment and International
Inequality’ 75 International Affairs 531, 537 (1999).
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